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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Robert H. Klugman*
Oral Admissions of Accused Recorded by Reporter in Shorthand
Admissible-In Mobley v. State, 85 N.E. (2d) 489 (Ind. 1949) the defendant was prosecuted for the murder of her three year old child.
During the investigation of the case certain statements in question and
answer form were made by the defendant to a reporter who recorded
them in shorthand. The trial court ruled that these statements were
admissible against the defendant as admissions. The Supreme Court of
Indiana affirmed the conviction, specifically pointing out that admissions
may be oral and may be testified to by anyone hearing them. There is
no necessity that they be written or signed.
Lay Witness Competent to give Opinion of Distance from Target at
which Firearm will make Powder Burns-In the recent case of Colbaugh
v. State, (Tenn., 1948) 216 S.W. (2d) 741, the defendant, charged with
murder, pleaded self-defense and contended that the fatal shot was fired
at a distance of from seven to ten feet. The state, after producing evidence of powder burns on the deceased's face, called a sheriff and an
ex-soldier who testified that a pistol such as that used by the defendant.
would not make a powder burn if fired from a distance greater than five
feet from the target. In affirming the trial court's conviction, the
Tennessee Supreme Court stated that the subject was one of common
knowledge and lay opinion was admissible. It noted specifically that
none of the witnesses was asked at what distance from the target the
gun was fred but only the distance such a gun would leave powder
burns. Appellant claimed that since the witnesses undertook to qualify
as experts by stating their experience and knowledge of firearms, they
must be treated as experts, and as such their qualifications were insufficient. The court ruled, however, that admissibility of the evidence
was a matter for the discretion of the trial judge and would not be
reversed unless clearly erroneous.
Defendant's Fingerprints at Scene of Crime Sufficient to Corroborate
Testimony of Accomplice-Defendant was charged with burglarizing a
theatre in the recent case of Rushing v. State, 199 P. (2d) 614 (Okla.
Cr. App. 1948). A participant in the burglary gave a detailed account
of the crime and testified that the defendant was his accomplice. Another witness for the state testified that fingerprints found at the scene
of the crime contained fifteen points of similarity with those of the
defendant in the police department records. The defendant's conviction
was affirmed by the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals. The court
declared that the fingerprints alone satisfied the Oklahoma statute requiring corroboration of testimony of an accomplice.
Three Additional States Enact Legislation Concerning Use of Chemical
Tests to Determine Degree of Intoxication-The legislatures of North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington recently enacted legislation con* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
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cerning the admission of evidence of the results of chemical tests of a
driver's breath, blood, urine, or other bodily fluids. The new laws are
all substantially the same, following closely the chemical test provisions
of Act V of the Uniform Vehicle Code. Similar legislation has previously
been enacted in Indiana, Maine, New York, and Oregon.
The new laws in general provide that in criminal prosecutions for
driving while under the influence of liquor the results of chemical tests
of the defendant's breath, blood, urine, or other bodily fluids shall be
admissible to determine the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood.
Certain percentages by weight of alcohol in the blood give rise to presumptions as to whether the defendant was driving while under the
influence of liquor. In most of these laws .05 percent or less is prima
facie evidence that the driver was not intoxicated to an extent to impair
his driving ability (Maine provides .07 percent); evidence of from .05
to .15 percent is admissible but gives rise to no presumption; if the
defendant's blood contains .15 percent or more, he is presumed to be
under the influence of liquor.
Provisions for the admission of evidence of chemical tests do not preclude admission of other evidence regarding a defendant's degree of
intoxication. If a defendant voluntarily submits to a chemical test to
determine the degree of his intoxication, he cannot have the evidence
excluded under any privilege against self-incrimination. (Spitler v.
State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E. (2d) 591 (1943)). But no state law has
specifically provided that a driver must submit to a chemical test, and the
Maine and Oregon statutes provide that failure of a driver to have a
test made cannot be used as evidence against him. (For an excellent
discussion of the legal aspects of legislation upon this subject, see Mamet,
Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic
Intoxication (1945) vol. 36 of this Journal at page 132. For a discussion of the medical aspects of the problem, see Rabinowitch, Medicolegal
Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication (1948) vol. 39 of
this Journal at page 225, and Comments on Dr. Rabinowitch's Paper
by Harger and Muehlberger, volume 39 at pages 402 and 411.)
Admission of Evidence Obtained by Unreasonable Search and Seizure
in State Court Prosecution Not Forbidden by Fourteenth AmendmentThe United States Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of evidence
obtained in an unreasonable search and seizure in a state court prosecution for a state crime in the recent case of Wolf v. People of California,
17 U.S. L. Week 4638 (1949:). The majority opinion, written by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, stated that although the "due process of law"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the first eight
amendments, it does guarantee all those rights "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." Included in this concept is security against arbitrary intrusion by the police. If a state, therefore, affirmatively sanctioned unreasonable searches and seizures, this would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, even though the Constitution guarantees the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court declared that
it was not necessarily true that such right need be enforced by excluding
illegally seized evidence in a subsequent trial.
At present 17 states have adopted the federal doctrine prohibiting the
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admission of illegally-seized evidence, while 30 are on record as opposing
it. This situation is left unchanged by the decision in the Wolf case.
(For an interesting article dealing with this subject, see comment
(1948) 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 354.
The Admissibility of Lie-Detector Test Results in Evidence-In Boeche
v. State, 37 N. W. (2d) 593, decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
on May 19, 1949, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in
refusing to admit in evidence the results of a lie-detector test made on
him by an investigator of the Nebraska Safety Patrol during the course
of an investigation of a forgery case. Although the Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction on other grounds, a majority of the
court sustained the trial court's ruling regarding the lie-detector evidence. Three of the seven justices expressed the opinion, however, that
lie-detector test results now seem ready for court acceptance. Nevertheless, even these justices agreed with the ultimate conclusion of the
majority regarding the rejection of the evidence in this particular case,
since the prosecution did not lay a sufficient foundation to properly
qualify the examiner as an expert; nor did the prosecution follow the
proper procedure in offering the lie-detector records in evidence.
The majority of the court reviewed the previous decisions rejecting liedetector evidence and concluded that "the scientific principle involved
... has not gone beyond the experimental stage and ...
that it has not
yet received general scientific acceptance." The majority opinion further
stated that "the experimenting psychologists themselves admit that a
wholly accurate test is yet to be perfected." On the other hand, three
members of the court were greatly impressed by ti testimony given in
the earlier New York case of People v. Kenny by Summers who claimed
perfection for his so-called "pathometer." They concluded that upon a
retrial of the case the results of the lie-detector test should be admitted
"if a proper foundation is laid whereby it would be established that the
operator was an expert in that field, and that the apparatus used and the
tests made thereunder have been given general scientific recognition as
having efficacy."
For a detailed discussion of the accuracy of the lie-detector evidence
and an exposition of the view that the test results should not be admitted
in evidence, see Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2d
ed., 1948).
Recent United States Supreme Court Decisions on Confession Admissibility-The cases of Watts v. Indiana, Turner v. Pennsylvania, and
Harris v. South Carolina, all involving the question of the admissibility
of confessions are analyzed and discussed on pp. 211-217 of this number of the Journal. The same article discusses the federal case of
Garnerv. United States, which also involved a confession problem.

